I agree with the main thrust of this piece although I might argue with many of the specifics. If I might summarise as succinctly as possible: "strategic ambiguity is dead, long live strategic ambiguity". The ambiguity now is around the trigger for intervention, degree of intervention, and reactions of potential allies.
I think the effect of the invasion of Ukraine on how other potential conflicts are perceived is only just beginning to be felt and will have a greater impact than commonly thought. Undoubtedly the total effect has been a deterrent to outright invasion. Russian difficulties alone would demand a reassessment of PRC's capabilities, as well as the Taiwanese appetite and ability to defend. International isolation of Russia has been greater than was generally assumed before the war. Direct intervention of US forces (or NATO) was clearly not promised nor anticipated by either side therefore probably has little impact on expectations for conflict in Taiwan. What has changed are expectations around many country's willingness to give a laconic "fight in the shade" response when faced with nuclear threats. This is apparent both in Ukraine itself and in Europe more generally where Russian threats have been ignored by countries providing support and also those joining NATO.
I would doubt that the US would ever make explicit nuclear commitments to Taiwan, not least because they would not be credible. Fortunately, Ukraine shows that nuclear commitments are not the be all and end all. Any would be ally of Taiwan in a future conflict should simply be prepared to withstand nuclear threats, and those with their own nuclear deterrent are well placed to do.
(I am the author) The overall effect of Ukraine is certainly not bad for Taiwan. However even outside any specific defense commitments, it would be bad for the international order if countries thought they could fulfill whatever messianic objectives they had simply by waving nukes around. Also, China could feel the need to prove its threats if nobody was taking it seriously - that was the subject of the recent war games.
We can say that nuclear threats could be ignored by allies, but Japan's armament isn't hurting anybody either and would be an entirely proportional response. Given this fact, it is only responsible to communicate this possibility ahead of time. China may not react the way we expect but at least they'll have the opportunity to consider their response.
I basically agree with this and also think Japan developing an independent nuclear deterrent is likely. I disagree with signalling it beforehand. This allows the opportunity for China to consider a pre-emptive strike, as USSR supposedly proposed on China when it developed its own nuclear weapons (only to be vetoed by USA). Also, I would suspect that the decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent by Japan and maybe even by Taiwan would be presented to USA and other allies more as a fait accompli. Something akin to Israel's programme although probably acknowledged officially after the fact.
.... as USSR supposedly proposed on China when it developed its own nuclear weapons (only to be vetoed by USA). You are missing one more supposedly, as in "supposedly only to be vetoed by USA".
I agree with the main thrust of this piece although I might argue with many of the specifics. If I might summarise as succinctly as possible: "strategic ambiguity is dead, long live strategic ambiguity". The ambiguity now is around the trigger for intervention, degree of intervention, and reactions of potential allies.
I think the effect of the invasion of Ukraine on how other potential conflicts are perceived is only just beginning to be felt and will have a greater impact than commonly thought. Undoubtedly the total effect has been a deterrent to outright invasion. Russian difficulties alone would demand a reassessment of PRC's capabilities, as well as the Taiwanese appetite and ability to defend. International isolation of Russia has been greater than was generally assumed before the war. Direct intervention of US forces (or NATO) was clearly not promised nor anticipated by either side therefore probably has little impact on expectations for conflict in Taiwan. What has changed are expectations around many country's willingness to give a laconic "fight in the shade" response when faced with nuclear threats. This is apparent both in Ukraine itself and in Europe more generally where Russian threats have been ignored by countries providing support and also those joining NATO.
I would doubt that the US would ever make explicit nuclear commitments to Taiwan, not least because they would not be credible. Fortunately, Ukraine shows that nuclear commitments are not the be all and end all. Any would be ally of Taiwan in a future conflict should simply be prepared to withstand nuclear threats, and those with their own nuclear deterrent are well placed to do.
(I am the author) The overall effect of Ukraine is certainly not bad for Taiwan. However even outside any specific defense commitments, it would be bad for the international order if countries thought they could fulfill whatever messianic objectives they had simply by waving nukes around. Also, China could feel the need to prove its threats if nobody was taking it seriously - that was the subject of the recent war games.
We can say that nuclear threats could be ignored by allies, but Japan's armament isn't hurting anybody either and would be an entirely proportional response. Given this fact, it is only responsible to communicate this possibility ahead of time. China may not react the way we expect but at least they'll have the opportunity to consider their response.
I basically agree with this and also think Japan developing an independent nuclear deterrent is likely. I disagree with signalling it beforehand. This allows the opportunity for China to consider a pre-emptive strike, as USSR supposedly proposed on China when it developed its own nuclear weapons (only to be vetoed by USA). Also, I would suspect that the decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent by Japan and maybe even by Taiwan would be presented to USA and other allies more as a fait accompli. Something akin to Israel's programme although probably acknowledged officially after the fact.
.... as USSR supposedly proposed on China when it developed its own nuclear weapons (only to be vetoed by USA). You are missing one more supposedly, as in "supposedly only to be vetoed by USA".
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a36519487/daniel-ellsberg-china-nuke-leak/