Should we go nuclear?

The stakes are higher than ever and America can no longer guarantee the security of its allies in Asia. Is it time to challenge nuclear taboo?

A model of the “Little Boy” nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945

I’ve attended a lot of nuclear energy conferences and never did I ever imagine sitting through a presentation about the OTHER kind of use for atomic energy: as a weapon. But that’s exactly what happened when I went to Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy 24 in Seoul last week.

Right after my own talk about how Taiwan finds itself as at a crossroads with its planned nuclear energy phaseout and a technical case study about how Korean SMART microreactors can help Canadian oil sands decarbonize production was a presentation by Professor Yoko Iwama on the Security Impolications of the Nuclear Power Technology in East Asia.

It turns out a lot of what I’ve happily believed and frequently repeated as a pro-nuclear advocate was a myth, a ploy, a comforting story: there is no bright line between the technology we use to create stable, low-carbon, economy-supporting nuclear energy and the kind that makes nuclear weapons. And that fact has become salient under tense present-day circumstances.

“With the credibility of American commitment to Taiwan and its extended nuclear deterrence waning, it is unlikely that Japan or Korea would be willing to totally give up the ‘hedging’ option,” said Professor Iwama of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), “This is probably easier under the current technology which makes it possible to accumulate certain amounts of plutonium.”

Later in the session, off-the-record, a professor of nuclear engineering based in the area confirmed that it might take the Japanese two months to get a nuclear weapon and the South Koreans two years. Basically, it’s the difference between having butter, eggs, flour and an oven ready and having a cake.

Why are the Japanese ahead? They already had enrichment technology by the time the US put their foot down about countries developing it so they were grandfathered in. Korea doesn’t, so it will take them a little bit more time to obtain that material.

“If Taiwan is taken over by the Chinese, Japan risks being finlandized,” said Professor Iwama. Having the ultimate deterrent by that time would help it maintain its autonomy if that were ever to happen.

I’ve heard this view here and there, most vociferously from Noah Smith. But it’s one thing to read about an idea in a blog and another to be at an industry conference and hearing it from a professor. In fact it’s been an open discussion for years, just not in my circles.

With the recent rise in tensions, it’s clear that the Overton Window is getting smashed on the nuclear issue in Asia. This is where we are, I just don’t know how to think about it yet.

Frankly, I wish all vulnerable US allied states were allowed to nuclear arm quite early: Ukraine, Japan, Korea and yes Taiwan. If that had happened, MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) might have kept us safe for a few more decades yet. In fact Taiwan was on the cusp of developing the bomb ourselves in a secret program back in the eighties, but a ROC colonel tattled to the Americans who put a stop to it.

The US tied the hands of its allies with the exception of Israel while rogues went ahead and helped themselves anyway. Now we realize we left those allies exposed. We feel a moral and strategic necessity to protect them, but the more we do, the more we raise the risk of nuclear escalation anyhow as we see now in the case of Ukraine. The west was exceedingly conservative in supplying Ukraine at the start of the war, allowing the Russians to gain an advantage. We’re terrified of crossing that red line because Russia is nuclear-armed, but we hate to see the Ukrainians lose, so we are salami-slicing towards it anyhow and the chunks are getting thicker.

The game theory of this is complex. Especially as obtaining nuclear capabilities is not an on-off switch. A country doesn’t automatically get protection with the creation of its first bomb. To be a credible threat, you have to have it in numbers and with suitable platforms for delivery.

. . .

I asked a retired South Korean Army Lieutenant-General at the conference to talk about the importance of Korean-Japanese “SMR collaboration” (hint hint, wink wink) what he thought might happen in the event of a Taiwanese invasion.

“Anyone who think Koreans can stay out of Taiwan if there’s a war are fools. We won’t have a choice. Why do we have 400 Korean soldiers training in the Philippines right now? It’s not to fight in the Philippines.”

I asked what Taiwan should do. “What should Taiwan do? If there’s an invasion we need you to fight like the Ukrainians. The Taiwanese need to realize that without freedom, life is not worth living.”

“But fight for how long”

“At least three months.”

“Because that’s how long it takes to defeat the Chinese?”

“Look, we’re not going to defeat China outright. But if President Xi can’t take Taiwan in three months, he’s going to have some troubles at home.”

I’m no military expert, but I’ve been informed that the Ukrainians fought like the Ukrainians and it’s been years and Putin don’t have much in terms of trouble at home. While it’s not the same for China for various reasons, I’m sure by the time China pulls the trigger, they would have thought of some contingencies. Is it time for Taiwan to also think about the ultimate deterrent? And is it already too late to do so, given how close we could be to an invasion-ready China?

Some quick googling revealed that the conversation in Taiwan is way ahead…I just haven’t paid attention to it. None of this is proven, but there’s rumored to be enough “ingredients” for six atom bombs socked away as far back as the Lee Tung-hui administration, although we need key technology — and more importantly the blessing — from the Americans.

. . .

Should we be thinking this way at all? When I first started Taipology I wrote in one of my first posts:

“Sometimes it can seem like Taiwan kinda forgot about the threat of a Chinese invasion. We’ve just been under the sword of Damocles for so long.”

I wonder if the same can be said for the possibility of atomic warfare. We’re kinda forgetting that it could kill us all. Lest this post comes off as cheerleading for rather than cautiously and reluctantly contemplating the possible advantages of arming Asian Allies with nuclear weapons, I want to end with a tweet by Elbridge Colby:

He’s not talking about nuclear arming Japan and Korea but the stakes are similar. Breaching the taboo for non-proliferation could have consequences down the line. I also worry that simply the possibility of surrounding countries getting nuked up could affect China’s intentions and timelines. It’s a conversation that indeed deserve sobriety and prudence. But it’s also time to start having this conversation. In fact, I wish we had this conversation years ago.